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In 1963 October 31, Detective Martin McFadden conducted a search on the person of John Terry, Katz, and Chilton Richard, after monitoring their suspicious behavior around a store. He retrieved two weapons from the two (Terry and Chilton), and they were subsequently charged with possession of concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the use of weapons seized as the primary evidence due to since it argued that the officer acted without probable cause. The two concurrent views in this case were that personal liberty of an individual could only be infringed in the presence of a probable cause, since the majority gives a police officer the authority seize and search a suspicious person. Secondly, that a law enforcing officer is empowered to address questions to people on the streets although they are not obliged to answer but this only gives the officer more reason for continued observation (Hemmens, Del & Brody, 2010).
The case had several points, which made it unique in that it addressed pertinent issues that had previously not been made clear. According to Siegel (2010), the first aspect of this case was that legality of the officer’s action where it was resolved that the fourth amendment is meant to protect people and not places, and as such, it applied to individuals everywhere whether on streets or home. The second issue in the case was the admissibility of the evidence against the wish of the petitioner and not the validity of the police conduct. Thirdly, the weapons retrieved from the two were used as evidence in the search that led to their seizure was lawful and reasonable.
Another crucial aspect of the case was that a prudent officer is warranted in the course of believing that there is reasonable suspicion that his life and those of others are in danger, to conduct a reasonable search. This is especially in areas where swift action is required and where obtaining a search warrant would not be to the convenience of the situation at hand. This reasonableness has to be assessed and determined in accordance and determined in light of the prevailing circumstances in which case the officer moves to neutralize the suspect of any weapon(s). The fifth aspect of the case is that exclusionary evidence rule cannot be applied to suppress the product of restrained and legitimate techniques used by the police in their investigation. This is because the officer was only performing his legal duty when the incidence occurred.
From a personal perspective, the law enforcement officer did not violate the privacy of Terry and the other colleagues. This is because the search was solely aimed at discovering hidden and dangerous weapons, which could be used in assaulting the detective and so endanger lives including those of the public. Also, the officer made a move to the group only after a thorough a careful monitoring of their activity, which left him with no doubt that they were up to mischief. It is important to note that this was a legal search since; it was not carried out with a view of retrieving evidentiary material, contraband items or anything else that which had not been instigated by reasonable grounds for arrest. The only justification that the officer had was self-protection and those that are within the vicinity of the eminent criminal activity. It is very clear that the police acted just in time to deter a crime from being committed under his watch.
There is not a constitutional barrier that holds a police from addressing questions to persons of suspicious character on the streets. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the approached person may choose to walk away but in proper circumstances such as those of Terry, the individual ought to be to comply in case of an investigative detention. It is worth reiterating that the person stopped is not obliged to answer since at this point the investigating officer compels no response. This search was therefore carried out under the provisions of the fourth amendment.
Justice Douglas dissenting opinion was that the decision to seize and search was left at the discretion of the police and must not be authorized by magistrate if such authority is an expressed choice as seen through a constitutional opinion. In essence, Justice Douglas meant that it was quite a mystery in itself how the court was to uphold any search and seizure without probable cause to convince that a crime had been committed, was either in the process being committed or was just about to be committed. Justice Douglas was mainly concerned with the fact that the case of Terry, the police were allowed not to get the search warrants under specified conditions but were to have similar probable cause as that which would require by a magistrate when a warrant is being sought. Therefore, this power only vested in the people who are the majority and whom the police have the prerogative to ensure that their lives and properties assets are safeguarded.
The judge further argued that the term “probable cause” implied a scenario that did not mean the same as “reasonable suspicion”. That meant that he was responding to the case using a standard that had not been made a law, but which he was sure that it would be in due course. Also, the judge argued that such an approach was perhaps necessary to deal with the then rising trends of modern forms of lawlessness. The fundamental law from which this case resulted is the constitutional fourth amendment, which holds that a police search cannot be unreasonable and that there must exist individual suspicion or reasonable cause for a search to be conducted.
In determining whether detective McFadden’s action was legal, the court granted a two-part analysis. In this case, an officer with reasonable suspicion conducts a search on the suspect during which if he feels a protruding weapon, he will intrude to recover it. In this analysis, the judge examined the nature of the police conduct, which is modeled on-the-spot observations that practically was not subjected to the fourth amendment’s requirement for a warrant. The judge also noted that the decision that the detective in Terry’s case was prompted to make would more often than not be based on probable cause.
Nonetheless, the court stated that the views underlying probable cause and the warrant were critical to determining the criteria under which the action of Detective McFadden would be analyzed. This was especially because the governmental interests in question were part of the reasonableness inquiry same as the personal interests of the suspect, which is aimed at avoiding invasion of his privacy. In view of the governmental interests, the presiding Chief Justice stated that, “in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulate facts which, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.”
In Terry’s case, the interests of the government were identified as effective crime detection and prevention, which is a reasonable interest that validates a law-enforcing officer to investigate possible and suspicious criminal behavior, even in circumstances where probable cause does not exist. The judge further said that it would have been very inappropriate and inadequate police conduct for an officer of McFadden’s experience and rank to observe such unusual behavior and just walk away from it without investigating the matter further.
The court noted that the crux of this case was not Officer McFadden investigating the petitioner’s weird and suspicious behavior, but whether there was justification for the intrusion of Terry’s privacy by conducting a search on him for dangerous weapons while the investigation was in progress. In this analysis, the “stop” aspect of the case was virtually ignored, which meant that it had literary jumped the issue of “frisking.” The court, therefore, wrote as follows. “When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.”
Another argument that was raised by Terry was that an officer ought not to perform a search not unless there is a probable cause for an arrest. He further argued that a frisk is classified, as a search in which case the probable cause is required (Atkin, 2013). In response, the court reasoned that Terry’s argument did not take into consideration the character, extent, and different purposes of search incidents to weapon frisk or an arrest. The judge also wrote noted that the life of the police officer may be endangered even before the probable cause for arrest comes into existence. The court therefore concluded that an officer is warranted to perform a search for dangerous weapons in cases where the officer is convinced that the suspect is armed and dangerous, whether or not he has probable cause to arrest if there is balance between reasonable search and the officer’s authority.
According to the court, probable cause was based upon the totality of circumstances, under which law enforcement officers find themselves while performing their duty. There are situations that allow an officer to frisk to ensure that the suspect is not carrying a weapon that would endanger the life of the officer as well as those that are around. The “frisking” practice is well accepted in the police practice, and the entire force unanimously agrees that it is only done for self-protection and not as a means of looking for evidence.
This means that there are several requirements for a police officer to frisk an individual. One is that the person must be lawfully detained while the investigation is underway. This directly means that the detention must be because of reasonable suspicion that a crime is about to be committed. Also, the officer is supposed to have reasonable belief that the individual is armed and thus dangerous (Bergman, Berman & EBSCO Publishing Firm, 2013). This reasonable suspicion may arise from various factors.
The first consideration is the type of eminent criminal activity that the officer might be investigating, such as that of Terry, which was evidently dangerous. It then follows that if an officer firmly believes that a given suspect is to be involved in a crime using dangerous weapons or that he is dealing in drugs using a gun as a tool of protection, such an officer is warranted to conduct a search of that suspect. Also, officers may rely on intelligence provided by citizens, behavioral indicators and bulges in the suspect’s clothes to do a search. Another factor is if the type of area in which the suspect is, that is, a high crime area or one that is known for weapons. The law requires that the officer documents each fact that he uses in the determination of a search, since these are what will consist the totality of circumstances.
This controversial question forced the Supreme Court first to determine when an individual is said to be “seized”. There was also the issue of what constitutes a search. The court opposed was to the notion that a “stop and frisk” could be classified as a seizure, which is subject to protection, by the fourth amendment. According to the court, seizing in this case implies a scenario where the police accosts a person and then curtails the right and freedom of the person to walk away, which is a police action that is just short of the traditional arrest (Martinez, 2014). The court as held that it defiles the real meaning of the English language to say that the mere exploration of an individual’s external clothing or the entire body while looking for weapons does not constitute a “search”. In essence, when the senior police officer stopped Terry and patted him down, a search was categorically provided for in the fourth amendment.
In conclusion, this case is a perfect representation of a reasonable suspicion and reasonable belief. In essence, the proceedings of this case eventually revealed that probable cause is the same as reasonable belief and that “stop and frisk” is equitable to reasonable suspicion in scenarios where it is backed by strong and articulate facts at hand. This resonates with the case in which Detective McFadden operated on reasonable grounds to determine the two petitioners were armed and dangerous. The only way that he could have addressed questions to the trio was first to search them for any weapons that might have endangered life while he investigated their conduct. In fact, the behavior was necessitated as a matter of urgency and priority. Therefore, the petitioner’s request for the suppression of the evidence acquired from the scene was not valid and ignored the scope and circumstances within which the evidence was obtained.
Atkin, M. L. (2013). Balancing Liberty and Security: An Ethical Study of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 2001-2009. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Bergman, P., Berman-Barrett, S. J., & EBSCO Publishing (Firm). (2013). The criminal law handbook: Know your rights, survive the system.
Hemmens, C., Del, C. R. V., & Brody, D. C. (2010). Criminal procedure and the Supreme Court: A guide to the major decisions on search and seizure, privacy, and individual rights. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Martinez, J. M. (2014). The greatest criminal cases: Changing the course of American law. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.
Siegel, L. J. (2010). Introduction to criminal justice. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.
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